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7ANNUAL REPORT 2017 – NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR  
THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 
TO  T H E  R E A D E R
Violent extremism refers to using, threatening with, encouraging or justifying violence 
based on one’s own view of the world or on ideological grounds. Violent radicalisation 
is an individual process which may result in a person joining violent extremist groups or 
action. At its most extreme, violent radicalisation may result in terrorist acts. The preven-
tion of violent radicalisation refers to the specific measures focused on those groups and 
individuals who run the risk of becoming radicalised. Prevention will target all forms of 
violent extremism in Finland. These include the violent far right, the violent far left and the 
violence used by radicalised alternative social movements, religiously motivated extremist 
violence as well as individual actors. 
On 29 April 2016, the ministerial working group on internal security and administration of 
justice approved an Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extrem-
ism. The Action Plan sets out principles for the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism in Finland, introduces their key definitions, describes the roles and responsibil-
ities of different actors in preventive work and establishes short and long-term objectives. 
A total of 36 practical measures have been decided within the framework of the Action 
Plan. The Action Plan was drawn up and will be implemented through broad cooperation 
between different authorities and organisations. The implementation of the Action Plan is 
coordinated and promoted by the National Cooperation Network consisting of the repre-
sentatives of different authorities, cities and organisations.
In Finland, violent radicalisation and extremism have been countered systematically since 
2012. Finland is closely engaged in international cooperation, actively exchanging experi-
ences, best practices and approaches with other Nordic countries and EU Member States 
and over a broader venue. International cooperation is an important part of national ef-
forts, because violent radicalisation and extremism are cross-border phenomena where 
both ideologies and operating methods quickly move from one country to another. 
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This annual report 2017 describes the progress made with the implementation of the Ac-
tion Plan. It also introduces the changes and trends that can be seen in violent radicalisa-
tion and in the operation of extremist groups and how the changes can be expected to 
affect preventive efforts. 
The content of the report is based on the information submitted by the authorities and or-
ganisations involved in preventive work. 
Tarja Mankkinen 
Head of development 
August 2017
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1 Introduction
The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was 
approved by the ministerial working group on internal security and administration of jus-
tice on 29 April 2016. The Action Plan was the second plan prepared, the Government de-
ciding on the first Action Plan in 2012 as part of a government resolution concerning the 
Internal Security Programme. 
The Action Plan contains important definitions of relevance to the theme, the key princi-
ples and objectives of the action, as well as 36 measures with defined responsible parties. 
The Ministry of the Interior coordinates and develops the prevention of violent radicalisa-
tion and extremism in Finland. Its responsibility is based on the Government Rules of Pro-
cedure, according to which the Ministry of the Interior and its Police Department remain 
responsible for matters concerning public order and security. Violent extremism, as a phe-
nomenon, relates to the core of maintaining public order and security: guaranteeing a safe 
living and operating environment and the safety of individuals and communities as well as 
protecting civil rights. For this purpose, the Ministry of the Interior has established a Steer-
ing Group and a National Cooperation Network. The other ministries and their branches of 
administration remain responsible for actions and development within their purview, pur-
suant to the Government Rules of Procedure. Municipalities, organisations and communi-
ties participate in the implementation of the Action Plan in accordance with the principles 
of cooperation.
Information and assessments concerning the implementation of the Action Plan are col-
lected annually, and a report on the implementation is submitted to the ministerial work-
ing group on internal security and administration of justice. This annual report is based on 
the information submitted by the parties participating in the implementation. The report 
has been preliminarily discussed in the National Cooperation Network and the Steering 
Group.
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2 About changes in the operational 
environment
The National Action Plan was prepared during the second half of 2015, finalised in early 
2016 and approved in April 2016.  Violent radicalisation and extremism are dynamic phe-
nomena largely affected by international developments and the changes and trends tak-
ing place in Finland.  Violent extremist groups and individuals also seek to make effective 
use of these changes and to harness them to support their own goals both in propaganda 
and recruitments.
The changes that have taken place in the operational environment after spring 2016 and 
that affect the threat and prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism are briefly 
outlined below.
2.1 Changes in the threat of violent radicalisation
Increased threat of attacks
Daesh (ISIS, ISIL) is suffering defeat in Syria and Iraq. However, this does not mean that it 
would cease to exist. In 2016, Daesh changed the key message in its propaganda by no 
longer encouraging Europeans to travel to the combat zones of Syria or Iraq but rather 
to carry out attacks in their home countries. Terrorist attacks have increased in Europe. 
Inspired by Daesh propaganda, attacks can be made by Daesh-controlled attack cells, in-
dependently acting cells or Daesh-inspired individuals or small cells. The attacks are often 
easy to carry out (using vehicles or knives) and do not require a long preparation time, 
during which the risk of becoming detected would increase. 
11
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Propaganda, fake news, hate speech and their impact on violent 
radicalisation  
Changes in the position of Daesh and the military losses it has suffered do not have any 
appreciable impact on the threat caused by violent extremist propaganda. The scope of 
Daesh propaganda has decreased, though it still reaches a large number of people in Eu-
rope. Other terrorist organisations, too, are adjusting their propaganda according to the 
mechanisms used by Daesh. The propaganda of terrorist organisations makes efficient use 
of social trends and events, which are presented in a way that support their ideology. The 
threat of terrorist attacks in Finland is enhanced by an increase of violent jihadist propa-
ganda focused on Finland and published in Finnish. The aim of fake news and disinforma-
tion is to weaken social cohesion and reduce trust in the democratic system, authorities 
and institutions. Hate speech, in turn, increases confrontation between population groups 
and communities and weakens the sense of security among individuals. All the above fac-
tors strengthen the seedbed for violent radicalism and extremism. 
Volume of suspected crime recorded by the police
The volume of extremist crime recorded by the police in Finland in 2015 did not increase 
despite the aggravated social situation and debate. However, the volume of hate crime 
recorded by the police increased considerably. Hate crime, including illegal hate speech, 
contributes to violent radicalisation and extremism. In addition to single victims, hate 
crime is focused on the group that the victim belongs to. It also heightens the sense of 
marginalisation and implies that society does not accept the group represented by the 
victim to be its member. As a result of all this, hate crime increases the threat of violent 
radicalisation.
People residing in the country illegally 
As a result of the situation with asylum seekers in 2015, the number of people residing in 
Finland illegally has increased. They are in a very poor position and are very vulnerable. 
They can be exploited in many ways: they can be used as cheap, even free workforce, re-
cruited to participate in criminal action or subjected to propaganda and recruitment urg-
ing them to join violent radicalisation. 
12
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Violent far right
A member of the Nordic Resistance Movement was sentenced to imprisonment for a fatal 
assault that he committed in the Helsinki Railway Square in September 2016. Due to the 
incident, the public became more aware of the presence of the Nordic Resistance Move-
ment in Finland. The national socialistic ideology of the Movement aroused a lot of atten-
tion. Groups resisting immigration, immigrants and Islam are still operating quite actively 
and visibly. Some individuals in these groups have connections with the violent far right.
Networks
The threat of violent action is connected with religiously motivated violent extremism as 
well as the violent far right. The actors involved in these may create a network in which 
individuals ready to commit violent acts find each other. In Finland, unlike in many other 
countries, the number and influence of such networks have been small, though their role 
has become more prominent in the last few years. According to the Finnish Security Intel-
ligence Service, there are 350 individuals in Finland who have connections with terrorist 
organisations and units. The threat of violent radicalisation and terrorism increases when it 
no longer involves only single individuals but also networks.
2.2 Trends crucial in view of prevention
Departures to combat zones in Syria and Iraq have decreased 
The goal of prevention since 2012 has been to prevent the departure of individuals and 
families to the combat zones in Syria and Iraq. The task has been challenging, due to poor 
support from legislation, for instance,1 and the efficient propaganda that Daesh broadly 
distributes over the Internet. It has been evident since the end of 2016 that travel to the 
conflict areas in Syria and Iraq has decreased. Some of the individuals who travelled there 
have returned or are about to return to their home countries. The focus of prevention has 
shifted to questions related to individuals returning from combat zones, such as bringing 
to justice those who have committed crime, and to matters related to their integration in 
society. In April 2017, the ministerial working group on internal security and administra-
tion of justice approved a proposal concerning the organisation of cooperation between 
the authorities in how to deal with individuals who return from combat zones, a deci-
sion that will guide all preventive actions taken in Finland. In addition, the National Police 
Board has issued police departments instructions on how to deal with individuals return-
ing from combat zones and with other risk individuals. Currently there are no visible signs 
indicating to which area individuals will depart next. 
1   Travel for the purpose of committing a criminal act of terror has been punishable since 1 December 2016.
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Lone actors
Lone actors are now an even more severe challenge, and it is difficult to prevent them 
from committing their acts. However, according to surveys, lone actors seldom act on 
their own. Instead, they have connections to other individuals sharing the same ideology 
through social media, and information may leak about the acts they are going to com-
mit. Individuals having performed attacks in Europe may have received instructions from 
persons outside Europe through chat or a corresponding medium. To prevent lone ac-
tors from committing an act of violence, the role of cooperation based on mutual trust is 
becoming more prominent. Important cooperation is pursued in local networks and new 
forms of operation based on multi-professional cooperation (e.g. the National Threats util-
ity of the police). 
Countering hate speech and hate crime
Countering hate speech and hate crime is an important element in the prevention of vio-
lent radicalisation and extremism. The police have assigned more resources to countering 
illegal hate speech after the incident that occurred in Helsinki Railway Square in Septem-
ber 2016. Organisations are working hard to counter hate speech, racism and discrimi-
nation. From the point of view of prevention, it is important to stress the importance of 
countering hate speech, to develop preventive actions and to help and support its victims. 
In case of concern, there must be a contact point
Interfering with violent radicalisation at a sufficiently early stage requires that procedures 
to be followed in case of concern about radicalisation have been agreed locally. In prac-
tice, this means that local actors must know whom they should contact if there is concern 
about the behaviour or situation of a particular individual. The contact point can be the 
Anchor Team or a contact person indicated by the city or the police. Appropriate proce-
dures have already been agreed upon in several localities, though there are still many 
localities that do not know how to deal with this. It may also be that the localities have 
agreed upon the procedures to be followed, but the information has only been distributed 
to a small group. 
Importance of case management and service coordination
International and national experiences have shown how important it is to offer alterna-
tives to individuals who have become or are in the danger of becoming radicalised.  Offer-
ing the right alternative at the right time plays a key role in order to halt the radicalisation 
process. For prevention, it is crucial that the individual can be directed to the necessary 
services at the right time.  Support for regular life and ability to cope, Exit service, a job, 
a place in an educational institution, an interesting hobby – all of these can play a prom-
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inent role in preventing radicalisation. It is also vital that smooth cooperation is ensured 
between the authorities and organisations in order to ensure that sufficient alternatives 
are available.
2.3 Development of national legislation and guidelines
Travel with the purpose of committing a terrorist act
Travel for the purpose of committing a criminal act of terror has been punishable since 1 
December 2016. A Finnish citizen, a person permanently resident in Finland or a person 
departing from Finland, who travels to a state whose citizen he/she is not or where he/she 
does not live permanently with the purpose of committing a criminal act of terror there, 
is considered to commit a punishable act. Also the mere attempt to travel with the above 
purpose is considered punishable. Financing a travel offence is a punishable act and con-
sidered the financing of terrorism. 
Internal guidelines of the police
The National Board of Police has issued guidelines on how police units should cooperate 
in the case of individuals posing a threat of terrorism of violent extremism. The guidelines 
also stipulate how the local police should cooperate with the municipal authorities and 
organisations offering services.
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3 Achieving the objectives set in the 
Action Plan
Short-term objectives extending to the end of 2018 were set for the prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism. The progress made with the action towards the objectives is 
discussed below.
Objective 1: National and local structures and procedures based on multi-professional coop-
eration are in place, which makes it possible for the authorities, organisations and communi-
ties to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism.
All police departments run multi-professional Anchor model activities. The 
capability and competence of the Anchor teams to prevent violent radicalisation 
and extremism varies.
Objective 2: The volume of ideologically motivated crime will continue to decrease year by 
year. 
The first survey of the volume of extremist crime was drawn up in 2015. The 
National Police Board has issued guidelines to the police departments on the 
follow-up of violent extremist crime, based on a Government decision dated 29 
September 2016. It is envisaged that follow-up data on trends in the volume of 
crime can be collected based the aforementioned actions in 2018. 
Objective 3: The number of individuals departing to Finland to attend fighting/violent activi-
ties in conflict areas begins to fall, compared with the situation on 1 November 2015. 
The number of individuals travelling to the area began to fall during 2015, due to 
the situation in Syria and Iraq. 
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Objective 4: Individuals returning from conflict areas are identified. Those returning from 
conflict areas will be identified and the ones having committed crimes will be brought to jus-
tice. All returning persons will be systematically targeted with individually tailored measures 
which reduce the risk of violence and help improve their ability to cope. 
On 29 March 2017, the ministerial working group on internal security and 
administration of justice approved a cooperation-based model in order to achieve 
this objective. The Ministry of the Interior has sent a request for action to parties 
who have responsibilities in the implementation of the model. Follow-up data 
will be collected in spring 2018, after which information on the results can be 
presented. 
Objective 5: The police will efficiently detect and investigate hate crimes. The victims of hate 
crime will be supported and the impacts of crime on the victim’s reference group will be identi-
fied. 
On 29 September 2016, the Government concluded a decision to intensify 
measures to counter hate speech, violent extremism and illegal extremist 
movements. The ‘Final Report of the Working Group Preparing an Action Plan 
for Countering Hate Speech and Hate Crime’ by the National Police Board was 
published on 14 November 2016. It presents intensified actions by the police to 
counter hate speech and hate crime. In its supplementary budget for 2017, the 
Government allocated additional appropriations to the police for countering 
hate speech. With the financing, it has been possible to establish one police 
position for each police department to counter punishable hate speech. In 
addition, five additional positions have been established for the National Bureau 
of Investigation, especially in order to intensify intelligence over the Internet and 
to investigate tips received through the Net Tip service. A unit detecting and 
investigating hate crime, such as punishable hate speech, has been established at 
Helsinki Police Department, covering the whole country. Ten new police positions 
were established at Helsinki Police Department for setting up the unit. The Crime 
Victim Directive, which entered into force in Finland on 16 November 2015, has 
introduced the need for support services to the victims of hate crime. Victim 
Support Finland has developed support for the victims of hate crime, advising and 
supporting the victim at all stages of the process. 
The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism has al-
so set long-term objectives extending to the year 2025. These will not be discussed in this 
first follow-up report.
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4 Priorities for 2016–2017 and possible 
future priorities
The following three themes were defined for use as the operational priorities of the Na-
tional Cooperation Network for 2016–2017:
• Developing the preconditions of the education sector to prevent vi-
olent radicalisation and extremism.
• Developing and expanding local operations
• Developing and launching the RADINET action
For the education sector, the operations have proceeded well, as described in more de-
tail in the section on the follow-up of the implementation of the measures. There are also 
international expectations towards Finland in terms of how it can prevent violent radical-
isation through measures implemented as part of teaching. The educational system in Fin-
land has been rated to be one of the best in the world and is expected to be very active in 
developing best practices in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism in the region. 
The role of the education sector in preventing violent radicalisation is also underlined by 
the fact that today even younger people become violently radicalised and are suspected 
of terrorist crime. 
For local actions, the most important thing is to extend the Anchor model to the districts 
of all police departments, an objective that has almost been completely achieved. Local 
cooperation groups established in the cities of Oulu, Turku and Tampere are working effi-
ciently. They help form and maintain a local situation picture about violent radicalisation 
and extremism across different sectors. The cooperation also promotes the development 
of competence and the dissemination of best practices. The operation of local coopera-
tion groups has facilitated collaboration between the authorities and with organisations, 
and lowered the threshold of acting together across sectoral boundaries, where necessary. 
For local operations, the challenge in the future is how to improve the skills of the actors 
engaged in the Anchor model in their efforts to prevent violent radicalisation. The capa-
bilities of the Anchor model actors will be significantly improved by the project launched 
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under the National Police Board on 1 September 2017 for preparing an Anchor Handbook. 
Another challenge is the formation of cooperation groups in localities where there is need 
to intensify cooperation between the authorities and with organisations. 
The RADINET exit service has been launched successfully in Finland. The customers have 
found their way to using the service without any major communication campaigns. The 
number of customers is high as compared with a corresponding service in the Neth-
erlands, for instance, even though there the action was introduced earlier and much 
more resources have been allocated to it. It is evident that there is need for an organisa-
tion-based service of this kind. The challenge in the future is how to make the resources 
match the demand for the service. Another major challenge is to ensure the national cov-
erage of the service by increasing the number of organisations belonging to the network. 
At the same time, it must be ensured that the action is reliable and adheres to the same 
principles regardless of the service provider. 
Yet another challenge in the future is to how to involve social and health services in work 
on preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. Both the sectors play an important 
role, though currently their engagement in the action largely relies on a few persons inter-
ested in the matter. Social and health services have long experience of preparing for crises 
and catastrophes. Currently social and health services are also developing the ability to act 
in the case of a terrorist attack within the framework of international cooperation. It is also 
important to ensure that social and health services contribute to preventing violent radi-
calisation and extremism.
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5 Implementation of the measures 
decided in the Action Plan
A total of 36 measures to prevent violent radicalisation have been decided under the Na-
tional Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. The parties 
responsible for the various measures are indicated separately for each measure. The imple-
mentation of the measures is briefly described below. 
MEASURE 1:  
Coordinate prevention, disseminate best practices, increase competency and act 
flexibly by taking into account changes in the operating environment
Objective: The aim is to make the action coherent, without unnecessary duplication 
or gaps. Competency and best practices are easily available to everyone. The actions 
are developed and reviewed according to the changes in the operating environment.
ACTION 1: The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism will 
be reinstated for another term. It reports to the Ministry of the Interior and its composition 
reflects the priorities and focus areas of action (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior) 
Outcome: The National Cooperation Network and Steering Group were established 
on 24 May 2016. The Steering Group was convened once and the National Coop-
eration Network six times before summer 2017. The activities are supported by 
four thematic networks: RADINET, local actions, research and reducing the threat 
of focused violence. According to the decision of the Steering Group, the priorities 
of the National Cooperation Network for the period 2016–2017 are: to develop the 
capabilities of the education sector to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism, 
develop and expand local activity, and develop and launch the RADINET service.
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ACTION 2: The intersectoral early intervention model (Anchor model) operating in police 
departments prevents violent radicalisation and extremism and carries out individual early 
intervention. Organisations and representatives of communities are also involved in this 
activity. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board). The police have 
decided to establish the intersectoral Anchor model in each police department. In addi-
tion to the police, representatives of social services as well as psychiatric nurses and youth 
workers, among others, operate within the framework of the Anchor model. Support and 
participation from the other authorities is needed for the Anchor model to be established. 
The capacity of the Anchor model to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism is con-
tingent upon the local operating environment and situation picture according to three 
levels: the minimum, basic and high level. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National 
Police Board)
Outcome: All police departments run Anchor model activities. In the supplemen-
tary budget for 2017, additional resources were allocated to the police for devel-
oping multi-professional activities, and the number of personnel participating in 
the Anchor model was increased accordingly. One man-year was allocated to each 
police department for the implementation of the activities. At the time of reporting 
(2 May 2017), personnel recruitments were still partly in progress. Helsinki Police 
Department has trained the personnel of all police departments in the preven-
tion of violent radicalisation and extremism. In February 2017, the Ministry of the 
Interior arranged an Anchor seminar, in which 130 experts from different parts of 
the country participated. A project financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers is 
currently in progress for gathering information and best practices from multi-pro-
fessional work forms that are in use in other Nordic countries and are comparable 
to the Anchor model. The Internal Security Fund has allocated financial support for 
preparing material and the Anchor Model handbook and for arranging training. The 
project is coordinated by the National Police Board and will be launched in Septem-
ber 2017. 
ACTION 3: Cooperation among the authorities, organisations and communities is car-
ried out in an intensified manner in Helsinki, Turku, Oulu and Tampere. These localities will 
launch the ‘Reach Out’ action establishing a close-knit community uniting the authorities, 
organisations, communities and religious actors that work under the umbrella of prevent-
ing violent radicalisation and extremism. The participants will receive intensive support 
for their efforts to curb violent radicalisation and extremism. The goal is to make available 
everyone’s expertise and experiences among all participants and to spread the word of 
available services and best practices in the region. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, 
Finn Church Aid (FCA)).
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Outcome: The Reach Out project received financial support from the Internal 
Security Fund in summer 2016. With the support, Finn Church Aid hired one pro-
ject employee and, in support of the project, conducted a background survey 
in order to assess families’ need for support within the family support model. In 
autumn 2016, information was collected on the situation in the project’s target 
localities and the need for increasing cooperation. Targeted cooperation meetings 
were arranged in order to increase knowledge of families’ need for support and the 
related phenomena together with the authorities and civil society actors. Cooper-
ation has been pursued in the project with the EU’s Radicalization Network RAN, 
the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and other international 
networks in order to increase the knowhow and its exchange as part of interna-
tional cooperation. The project participated in the Nordic cooperation seminar in 
autumn 2016 and arranged an expert seminar in spring 2017 in collaboration with 
the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in Helsinki. The 
key goal of the project is to develop support for those families whom violent radi-
calisation especially concerns. Developing this support calls for close cooperation 
and trust between different actors. To build trust, local dialogue between different 
actors has also been arranged during the project. Actions have been planned and 
implemented based on a need survey, including seminars on the theme in spring 
2017. An international seminar on the project was arranged at the end of August 
2017. Additional project funding was allocated from the Internal Security Fund to 
the work done by Finn Church Aid in order to proceed with and develop the work 
for a period of 18 months.
ACTION 4: Cooperation in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism will be 
increased among the cities in the capital region and their police departments to ensure 
that a radicalised individual living in the region, or one about to become radicalised, will 
not be left without the appropriate support merely because of red tape. (Responsibility: 
National Police Board, the Cities and Police Departments of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa).
Outcome: The chiefs of police and mayors of the capital region established a coop-
eration network in 2016 in order to prevent violent extremism. The purpose of the 
working group is to ensure that effective structures are in place to monitor and 
tackle violent extremism and to exchange information in the capital region, includ-
ing the municipality of Kauniainen. Two meetings were held in 2016 and a third one 
in January 2017. Single cases involving individuals returning from conflict areas, 
for instance, are dealt with together with the cities and police departments of the 
capital region in accordance with the model of dealing with returning individu-
als, which was approved by the ministerial working group on internal security and 
administration of justice on 29 March 2017. 
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MEASURE 2:  
Launch the RADINET (exit) service
Objective: Develop a service which supports the disengagement of radicalised 
persons from violence and from the sphere of influence of violent groups.  
Simultaneously, this will reduce the threat of violence to society and people.
ACTION 5: Launch the RADINET (exit) service It is systematic action targeting the indi-
vidual and its aim is for the person in question to renounce ideologically motivated vio-
lence or disengage from it. Entering the process is voluntary. The objective of the Rad-
inet service is to reduce the threat of violence and it is a supplement to criminal justice 
instruments. It is impossible to reduce the threat of violence posed by violent extremist 
movements or criminal gangs to people and society by tackling the problem of violence 
through a criminal justice response alone. In the first phase the action targets the radical-
ised supporters of religiously motivated violence and in the second phase the radicalised 
supporters of violent right-wing groups. Participation in the Radinet service is voluntary. 
The action is coordinated by the Vuolle Settlement, and many organisations, supported by 
religious communities, participate in organising services. While the Radinet service is sup-
ported by local grass-roots organisations and representatives of religious communities, 
the steering group also includes the key authorities regarding this action. (Responsibility: 
Vuolle Settlement, organisations, Ministry of the Interior).
Outcome: The Radinet (exit) service was launched at the beginning of 2016 
through financial support from the Finnish Slot Machine Association (now the 
Funding Centre for Social Welfare and Health Organisations (STEA)) in 2015. In the 
financing decision of December 2016, financial support was allocated to the action 
for the following three years. With the support, it is possible to hire two employees, 
which is half of what was proposed. More personnel resources are needed in view 
of the need for the service. Link to STEA’s article on the Radinet service: http://www.
stea.fi/-/radinet-yhteistyota-radikalisoitumisen-ennaltaehkaisemiseksi. 
The Radinet service has been developed in the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness 
Network and through Nordic cooperation. A seminar focusing on the exchange 
of experiences was arranged with the Netherlands in spring 2017. Based on this 
benchmarking, it can be said that the Radinet service has been launched superbly 
in Finland. Through Radinet, the customer work has reached specific individuals, 
and long-term customer relationships have been established with some of them. In 
addition, the project workers have consulted and guided professionals from differ-
ent sectors on the work done with the target group. The customers represent the 
violent far right and religiously motivated violent extremism. Vuolle Settlement’s Via 
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Vis anti-violence services (Oulu), Settlement Puijola’s Aggredi anti-violence services 
(Kuopio) and Helsinki Mission’s Aggredi anti-violence services are involved in the 
Radinet anti-violence network. Efforts to are going on to attract new organisations 
to the activities, with the aim of increasing the national coverage of the network. 
Other key development targets in progress are the development of customer guid-
ance from the police to Radinet and making sure that the autonomous actors in the 
network adhere to jointly agreed operating principles. The national coverage of the 
network should be better. Developing a model for preventing the radicalisation of 
minors and referring them to treatment is also being considered. 
Information on the RADINET service 2016–2017:
• a total of 37 customers and 108 customer meetings
• 13 consultations and guidance sessions 
• 24 customers met personally
• 19 male customers, 5 female customers
• 13 customers with 1–3 appointments
• 9 customers with 4–10 appointments
• 2 customers with more than 10 appointments
• 13 customers met due to religious ideology
• 11 customers met due to political ideology
• customer age distribution 17–58 years
ACTION 6: Prevent radicalisation in prisons. Prisoners are in many ways vulnerable and, 
hence, particularly susceptible to the propaganda and recruitment of violent extremist 
groups. Radicalisation in prisons is one of the greatest concerns in European countries. In 
line with the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union, Finland commits to imple-
ment a considered and tailor-made policy to prevent radicalisation leading to terrorism 
and violent extremism in prisons. This policy is adapted to national circumstances and 
the needs of the individuals involved, which could include elements such as: developing 
risk assessment tools and tools to detect early signs of radicalisation; training prison staff 
to recognise radicalisation; offering inmates opportunities for learning and developing 
critical thinking skills in prison, etc. The policies of the Council for Penological Co-opera-
tion (PC-CP) on radicalisation and extremist violence, a subordinate body to the Council of 
Europe, and the experiences of the Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence 
(RAN) will be taken into account in planning and implementing the activities, with active 
participation in the operation of the network. Finland will also participate in the operation 
and development of the RADINET (exit) network insofar as the action concerns remand 
prisoners (detainees) and sentenced prisoners. (Responsibility: Ministry of Justice, Criminal 
Sanctions Agency).
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Outcome: The Vantaa prison in Finland is presently implementing a project aimed 
at developing methods for identifying radicalisation in prison and violent extrem-
ism in prison. The aim is to identify radicalisation and violent extremism in prison 
as early as possible in order to efficiently prevent and tackle the phenomenon. 
The question is not of an Exit project, however. During the project, more than 70 
persons were identified in prisons who can be considered to be prone to violent 
extremism or some degree of radicalisation based on their behaviour or the obser-
vations made of them. After the project, the methods and policies used in it will be 
recommended for use as permanent practices for the Criminal Sanctions Agency. 
The personnel of the Criminal Sanctions Agency were trained during the project to 
identify violent extremism and radicalisation in prison. The training was arranged 
nationwide for the personnel of twelve (12) prisons, seven (7) community sanctions 
offices, five (5) assessment centres, two (2) prison clinics and one (1) psychiatric 
prison hospital. Participation in the training was voluntary, and the personnel were 
motivated and interested in the subject. More than 200 persons participated in the 
training. The employees of the Criminal Sanctions Agency have also been trained in 
the use of the violent extremism assessment tool VERA2/2r.
MEASURE 3:  
Launch the Helpline service to support the family and friends of the radicalised 
people
Objective: Support the family and friends of the radicalised people in situations 
where a family member or friend has, or is about to, become radicalised.
ACTION 7: The families and friends of those who have become radicalised need support. 
The support can be pre-emptive when the individual is only considering joining some 
ideologically based extremist group or movement. Likewise, support is also needed when 
the individual has already joined such a group or movement. For example, support can 
materialise in the form of expert counselling and guidance on how to act in a given situ-
ation and to whom one can turn for the required services. Support can also be provided 
for a family whose child has departed for a combat area. According to preliminary experi-
ences, individuals that abandon their action in a combat area and return home do so as a 
direct result of family influence. Yet another objective of the support is to help the family 
overcome the crisis. It must be ensured that the other family members do not become 
radicalised because of pressure or shame.  The organisations are expanding their action in 
supporting families and individuals who suffer from radicalisation and violent extremism 
by launching the Helpline action, which assists families and friends in questions related 
to radicalisation. The expert assistance and support of the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness 
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Network Centre of Excellence (RAN) will be utilised when the action is being developed. 
(Responsibility: organisations, Ministry of the Interior).
Outcome: The Action is part of the Reach Out project (Action 3). The situation of 
families was investigated in autumn 2016. The results indicated that the families are 
almost completely outside of any services and support measures, which increases 
their risk of becoming marginalised. The situation can also lead to radicalisation 
of the individual family members. Based on the investigation, plans are currently 
being drafted for further work. 
MEASURE 4:  
Promote the actions of organisations in developing services to which violently 
radicalised people can be referred
Objective: Everywhere in Finland there are organisations that have violence-
prevention services that facilitate disengagement from violence, including 
ideologically motivated violence. The authorities, especially the police, are aware of 
these services, and case management and service coordination function in an efficient 
and comprehensive manner.  
ACTION 8: Even in spite of the fact that young men are over-represented among the 
perpetrators and victims of crime, there are only a few anti-violence and disengagement 
services available for young men in particular. Most services are provided by organisa-
tions. Only a small fraction of the young men seek out or are referred to these services. 
We will promote the nationwide proliferation of organisation services that support disen-
gagement from violence occurring outside the home. We will promote the expansion of 
the scope of activities of anti-violence organisations to include the prevention of ideo-
logically motivated violence through international and domestic training. The awareness 
of the authorities, especially the police, regarding the available services will be increased. 
(Responsibility: National Cooperation Network for preventing violent extremism, local 
cooperation groups, organisations, National Police Board). Grass-roots organisations are 
present in people’s everyday life. These organisations play an especially important role 
when it comes to preventing travel to conflict areas and teaming up with violent right-
wing gangs. We will support and promote the activities of these organisations and their 
abilities to participate in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. Organ-
isations also provide an avenue for non-violent social activism (Responsibility: National 
Cooperation Network, local cooperation groups).
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Outcome: The RADINET network promotes an increase in the number of organisa-
tions engaged in the network. Different actors (the authorities, organisation repre-
sentatives) are involved in the projects of grass-roots organisations, with the aim of 
increasing interaction between those participating in the activities. Local coopera-
tion groups and the organisations involved in them cooperate in order to develop 
the services of different organisations. The City of Oulu’s service areas pursue coop-
eration with organisations, especially with regard to educational and cultural ser-
vices. A good example of this is Villa Victor, which supports the launch of the Forum 
of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations in Oulu. 
MEASURE 5:  
Increase competency, expertise and awareness as regards the prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism
Objective: Professionals and the representatives of organisations who, in their 
everyday work, encounter people who have, or are about to, become radicalised 
are able to widely recognise the underlying signs of radicalisation and properly act 
in order to put an end to the development that leads to radicalisation. Developing 
competencies and professional skills is supported by information obtained from 
research. 
ACTION 9: The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism will 
annually assess the training needs upon which a comprehensive training plan will then 
be prepared that also takes account of the training for which specific actors are responsi-
ble. The training specifically addresses the key sectors of action: education, youth work, 
social and health services and the police as well as basic and high-level local cooperation 
groups. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network, local cooperation groups).
Outcome: The members of the National Cooperation Network have been requested 
to submit training information, and the matter is currently being prepared. To be 
implemented during 2017. 
ACTION 10: Promote research that yields information supporting the prevention of vio-
lent radicalisation and extremism. Actively participate in Nordic and international research 
activities, and effectively utilise national and international research financing sources. 
(Responsibility: researchers, different branches of administration, and other actors within 
their respective sectors) 
27
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATION  24/2017 ANNUAL REPORT 2017 – NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR  
THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 
Outcome: The survey ‘Suomesta Syyrian ja Irakin konfliktikentille suuntautuva liik-
kuvuus’ (‘Mobility from Finland to the Conflict Areas of Syria and Iraq’: in Finnish)
(Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom, Saarinen), implemented with financial support from 
the Government, was published in autumn 2016. It provides more information on 
motives and the persons who have travelled to Syria and Iraq. Finnish researchers 
have participated in Nordic research cooperation that has been carried out as part 
of the Nordic cooperation agreement on preventing violent extremism. Extensive 
research seminars have also been arranged on this theme in Sweden. A researcher 
network, whose first meeting was arranged in March 2017, is part of the Coopera-
tion Network for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. 
ACTION 11: The National Police Board provides guidance and remains responsible for 
pre-emptive action and the systematic training of the Anchor model as regards matters 
associates with violent radicalisation and extremism. The Anchor model actors will net-
work with each other and disseminate best practices and lessons learned. The expertise 
of the police will be utilised in training local networks and other authorities. The Anchor 
model actors will remain responsible for providing training at minimum-level localities. 
(Responsibility: National Police Board, Anchor model actors). 
Outcome: The Helsinki Police Department arranged training for all police depart-
ments on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism between late 2016 
and early 2017. All police departments have capabilities and materials to train local 
stakeholders in addition their own personnel. The networking of the Anchor model 
actors was promoted through a seminar arranged by the Ministry of the Interior in 
February 2017, in which a total of 130 experts participated. It was expressly hoped 
in the seminar that a corresponding event would be arranged annually in future. 
The volume and scope of the stakeholder training arranged by the police has var-
ied according to police department in the early part of the year. Training has pri-
marily been arranged for specific target groups, such as education services, where 
requested, and the theme has also been discussed in connection with specific oper-
ative cases together with private sector security experts, for instance. Based on the 
information that the National Police Board has received from police departments, 
an important target group in the training has been persons working with recep-
tion centres and asylum seekers. Among other things, the National Police Board 
has trained the immigration officers and contact persons of Employment and Eco-
nomic Development Centres, TE office employees, managers and experts working 
with asylum seekers, and social and health care actors in Uusimaa. It has also given 
speeches on the subject in special regional defence courses and standby officer 
meetings.
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ACTION 12: The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism 
will organise annual seminars and other events which gather the different actors together. 
‘Tietotalo’ seminars will be continued. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network).
Outcome: Seminars and other occasions arranged in 2016: 
• three seminars on hate speech and violent radicalisation, arranged 
in different parts of the country in collaboration with the Central Ad-
ministration of the Church
• two ‘Tietotalo’ seminars in Seinäjoki
• the Kick Off seminar of the National Action Plan in Helsinki
• a national seminar on the RADINET service in Helsinki 
• a community seminar in Tampere in collaboration with Finn Church 
Aid
• round table discussions with the Uskot Forum
• a Nordic seminar on preventing violent radicalisation as part of the 
chairmanship of the Ministry of the Interior in the Nordic cooperati-
on network 
Seminars and other occasions planned and arranged in 2017: 
• Anchor seminar at the Police University College in Tampere
• a round table occasion convened by the Minister of the Interior and 
the Minister of Education with regard to the Safari camp arranged in 
summer 2016
• four REACH OUT project seminars 
• a national seminar on Violent Radicalisation and Extremism The 
Ministry of the Interior and the University of Helsinki will together 
arrange a seminar in September 2017 in which the first seminar 
day is devoted to the theme ‘Fears Related to Terrorism and How to 
Control Them - Research Data and Perspectives’ and the second day 
to ‘How to Improve the Effectiveness of the Prevention of Violent Ra-
dicalisation and Extremism?’.
• round table discussions with the media (Autumn 2017)
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ACTION 13: Actively participate in international events and training with the objective of 
obtaining new information and disseminating best practices and lessons learned. The goal is 
to evenly provide training among all regional and local actors while taking into account the 
local level of the threat of violent extremism, and the need for training. In addition to the 
authorities, also promote the possibility of the representatives of organisations, cities and 
communities to participate in the training. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network).
Outcome: Actors involved in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
have participated in the seminars and occasions arranged by the sub-working groups 
of the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network RAN. Representatives from national and 
local networks engaged in the action have participated in the Nordic Safe Cities net-
work operating in connection with the Nordic Council of Ministers.  The network pub-
lished ‘The Nordic Safe Cities Guide’ in spring 2017, which is intended for cities. Finland 
is engaged in the Policy Planners Network PPN whose meeting in London in autumn 
2016 centred around the theme of preventing violent radicalisation in education. A 
seminar of the RAN Education sub-working group was arranged in Helsinki in March 
2017. Together with the seminar, a meeting was arranged on how to deal with individ-
uals returning from combat zones, and experiences were exchanged on this theme. 
A Nordic project targeted at preventing violent radicalisation was launched during 
Finland’s chairmanship period in the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2016. The purpose 
of the project is to provide tools and competency for preventing violent radicalisation 
in educational institutions. The project has disseminated best practices and shared 
experiences. During Norway’s chairmanship period, a Nordic workshop for teach-
ers was arranged at Utöya near Oslo in May 2017 to improve their capabilities to take 
up controversial issues with their pupils (‘Teaching Controversial Issues’). The inten-
tion is that the participating schools and teachers would disseminate best practices 
in their areas, supported by the national coordinators of the Finnish National Agency 
for Education. In addition, EU working groups have discussed issues related to indi-
viduals returning from combat zones, for example. In spring 2017, the EU introduced 
the Network of National Prevent Policy Makers, the aim of which is to develop coop-
eration between experts responsible for the activity at the national level and to utilise 
the best practices evolved and developed in the RAN network in the preparation of 
national programmes. Finland acted as the chair of the Nordic Cooperation Network 
for preventing violent extremism in 2016–2017. In this context, a Nordic seminar was 
arranged in October 2016 and a meeting of ministers responsible for the theme in Hel-
sinki in January 2017. In addition, best practices and experiences have been shared. 
Minister Risikko visited the UN in May 2017 and was invited to the UN Counter-Terror-
ism Committee to explain the practices that Finland has employed to prevent violent 
radicalisation and extremism. The model applied by Finland to individuals returning 
from combat zones has been presented in several international occasions (e.g. in Düs-
seldorf, New York, Washington). 
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ACTION 14: As the focus areas of the supplementary training provided by the Finnish 
National Agency for Education and the Regional State Administrative Agencies are being 
determined, increasing the instruments and competency in identifying and handling 
propaganda and violent radicalisation and extremism in schools and educational institu-
tions will be taken into account. (Responsibility: Ministry of Education and Culture, Finnish 
National Agency for Education, Regional State Administrative Agencies).
Outcome: To date, supplementary training has been piloted for teachers three 
times in 2016 and 2017, coordinated by the Southern Finland Regional State 
Administrative Agency and the Ministry of Education and Culture. Training has also 
been arranged regionally. At the beginning of 2016, the Northern Finland Regional 
State Administrative Agency arranged two training occasions for education and 
youth service employees, one in Oulu and one in Kajaani. The instructors were 
members of the local cooperation group, Radinet/Via Vis and the local regional 
office of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. 
The Ministry of Education has allocated a discretionary government grant for edu-
cational personnel training to the University of Helsinki Centre for Continuing Edu-
cation HY+, to be spent on supplementary training for teachers for the prevention 
of radicalisation in schools. A total of 75 persons will be trained in the project by the 
end of 2018.
In spring 2017, the Finnish National Agency for Education published the handbook 
‘Interaction - Guide to Strengthening Democratic Involvement and Preventing Hate 
Speech and Violent Radicalism’ (in Finnish), http://www.oph.fi/download/182479_
rakentavaa_vuorovaikutusta.pdf. 
The handbook contains ideas concerning ethics, human rights, democracy com-
petencies, strengthening involvement, reconciliation and cooperation between 
schools and the police. The key idea is that schools should also learn to take up diffi-
cult, controversial topics constructively, critically and showing respect to others. The 
school should be a safe place where every member of the school community feels 
that he/she is recognised and capable of influencing common issues. Schools do 
not accept any hate speech or bullying. A school community supporting pupils pre-
vents individuals from becoming marginalised and supporters of extremist move-
ments. 
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ACTION 15: In the primary phase, the ‘electronic toolbox’ will be taken into use. The tool-
box, designed for professionals, will be further developed to meet the demands of the 
changing operating environment, the focus of activities and the information needs of 
the practitioners. The toolbox will become an integral element of nationwide prevention 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior).
Outcome: The Ministry of the Interior decided in autumn 2016 that work on devel-
oping the toolbox will be discontinued. It was replaced by a Facebook site entitled 
Eroon Extremismistä (Get Rid of Extremism) that was adopted at the beginning of 
2017. 
MEASURE 6:  
Efficiently detect and investigate hate crime, and support the victims and the target 
communities of hate crime
Objective: The police and the other law enforcement authorities will improve their 
action on detecting and investigating hate crime. One objective is to reduce the 
underlying causes of violent radicalisation and extremism.
ACTION 16: Hate speech and hate crime are linked to violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism. Hate speech can egg on those that are particularly vulnerable to commit hate crime 
or to link up with violent extremism. Individuals and groups targeted by hate speech and 
hate crime run a high risk of becoming radicalised, especially when they feel that society 
and the authorities do not sufficiently intervene and protect their rights. As part of their 
everyday work the police detect and tackle suspected hate crimes reported to the police 
and, when required, carry out criminal investigations. The Police Department of the Minis-
try of the Interior will prepare a report on how the process of detecting and investigating 
hate crimes should be intensified, and what kind of research and data support are needed. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior).
Outcome: As a result of the fatal assault committed at Helsinki Railway Square in 
September 2016, the Government decided, on 29 September 2016, on intensified 
steps to tackle the operation of violent extremist movements and to counter hate 
speech. For the relevant actions, the Government allocated financial support to the 
police from the supplementary budget for 2017 with the purpose of intensifying 
actions to tackle hate speech and hate crime. The actions are indicated in the Final 
Report of the Working Group Preparing an Action Plan for Countering Hate Speech 
and Hate Crime, which was published by the National Police Board on 14 Novem-
ber 2016. The police consistently and efficiently tackles all types of punishable hate 
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speech connected with violent radicalisation, agitating anti-foreigner hate speech 
or bullying between pupils. Especially children and adolescents should be protected 
from hate speech. The authorities seek to tackle hate speech primarily using preven-
tive means. The focus in criminal investigations is on actively detecting punishable 
hate speech in the Internet and tackling any actions related to it. A special group 
has been set up within Helsinki Police Department for countering hate speech. It 
combines visible police presence in the social media with other police operations. 
In addition, the investigation of web crime has been intensified, police presence in 
the social media is being increased, communications in countering hate speech and 
hate crime is being intensified, and training and research on the theme increased. 
The Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior will prepare a report, to be 
launched in 2017, on how the process of detecting and investigating hate crime 
should be intensified, and what kind of research and data support are needed. The 
first supplementary training entitled ‘Identifying and Encountering Hate Crime in 
Police Work’ was arranged at Policy University College in 2016. In 2016, the National 
Police Board signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office for Demo-
cratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for arranging TACHCLE hate crime instructor training 
at the Policy University College. 42 police officers from different police departments 
completed hate crime instructor training in two training occasions during spring 
2017. The instructors train the personnel of their police departments. 
ACTION 17: Hate crime has been defined as a crime against a person, group, a person’s 
property, institution, or a representative of these, motivated by prejudice or hostility 
towards the victim’s real or perceived ethnic or national origin, religion or belief, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity or appearance, or disability or some similar characteristic. When 
it comes to hate crime, the individual targeted by the crime is not the only victim. Rather, 
it is the entire community the victim represents. If the victim does not receive any support, 
the general willingness to report further hate crimes to the police may decrease. This, in 
turn, increases cynicism and the notion that hate crimes are not taken sufficiently seriously 
and that the victim will not receive justice. Together with Victim Support Finland (VS) the 
Ministry of the Interior has implemented the EU’s ‘Good Practice +’ project which creates 
the practices for supporting the victim of racist and hate crime. The best practices created 
through the project, and potential follow-on projects, will be implemented. (Responsibil-
ity: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board, Victim Support Finland). 
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Outcome: The Good Practice + project ended at the end of 2016 and the actions 
decided in it were implemented according to plan. The work will be continued in 
the G3P - Good Practice Plus Project Reloaded project, which will be launched in 
September 2017 and in which the Ministry of the Interior is involved. The various 
organisations have continued the activities and arranged different types of occa-
sions on the theme. The police intend to participate in the regional ‘How to Help 
Hate Crime Victims?’ training that will be arranged by the Finnish Red Cross and the 
‘Against Racism’ project during 2017. Victim Support Finland and the Office of the 
Non-Discrimination Ombudsman will also attend the training.
ACTION 18: Religious communities and religious premises can also become the tar-
gets of hate speech and hate crime. Finn Church Aid (FCA), working with religious com-
munities, develops action in which said communities will support each other when 
threatened or faced with a concrete danger. The ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ action will be 
further developed and implemented. (Responsibility: FCA, religious communities). 
Outcome: The activities have been launched and the project coordinator has 
started work in Finn Church Aid on 1 September 2016. The aim is to provide grass-
roots support to cooperation between local religious communities, promote good 
relations between population segments and create capabilities to work together to 
counter phenomena strengthened by social polarisation, such as hate speech and 
hate crime. During the autumn, the project coordinator visited different religious 
communities in order to investigate their cooperation needs and wishes with a view 
to developing an action model, promoting local cooperation and building trust in 
the capital region, Oulu, Turku and Tampere. The action model has been considered 
necessary, though the active development of the activities has been considered 
challenging. The work calls for resources that communities relying on voluntary 
effort cannot allocate to systematic cooperation in addition to their basic activities. 
Finn Church Aid has been promoting the action and its dissemination through sem-
inars and events during the spring but has not been able to secure resources for the 
further development of the action. 
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MEASURE 7:  
Actions resulting from the increased number of asylum seekers
Objective: Prevent the dissemination of violent radical propaganda and recruitment 
to violent extremist movements among asylum seekers, and efficiently carry out 
integration. The action will take into account the recommendations of the document 
‘The educational tracks and integration of immigrants – problematic areas and 
proposals for actions’ (Publications of the Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland 
2016:1).
ACTION 19: More than 32,000 asylum seekers arrived in Finland in 2015. According to 
estimates, the number of asylum seekers in Europe will remain high for the coming years 
as well unless the root cause of the problem, i.e. wars and conflicts around the world, can 
be resolved. Owing to their vulnerable status and uncertain future, asylum seekers can be 
particularly susceptible to extremist propaganda. Asylum seekers and reception centres are 
also targeted by vandalism and crimes. The aforementioned facts, coupled with problems 
in integration as well as misgivings and discrimination on behalf of the majority popula-
tion may also increase the risk of individual radicalisation. Reception centre staff and others 
working with asylum seekers will be trained to identify violent radicalisation and extremism 
and to prevent it. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board). 
Outcome: The Ministry of the Interior arranged a meeting in autumn 2016 for plan-
ning training for reception centres. In addition to representatives from the Ministry 
of the Interior, the National Police Board, the Finnish Immigration Service and Finn 
Church Aid were present. The content of the training was drafted in the meeting. 
However, necessary resources have not been available for implementing the train-
ing (money, people). Other reasons making it impossible to implement the training 
scheme are the abolishment of reception centres and the situation within the cen-
tres due to tension caused by negative decisions on asylum. The National Board of 
Police and some police departments have trained reception centre staff and others 
working with asylum seekers to identify violent radicalisation and extremism. The 
police will participate in the TURVA project arranged by the Finnish Immigration 
Service at the Oulu reception centre, the purpose of which is to improve asylum 
seekers’ perceptions about basic and human rights and to prevent crime. In spring 
2017, the Ministry of the Interior and key experts together investigated the situa-
tion with minor asylum seekers and the way in which they could be subjected to 
violence-urging propaganda and recruitment. 
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ACTION 20: Pursuant to the goals  of the Government action plan on asylum policy (8 
December 2015), Finland will effectively promote integration for those who have been 
granted a residence permit, proactively prevent feelings of social exclusion among young 
people and ensure safe growth and education paths, particularly for unaccompanied 
minors. The action will take into account the recommendations of the document ‘The 
educational tracks and integration of immigrants – problematic areas and proposals for 
actions’ (Publications of the Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland 2016:1). (Responsi-
bility: Ministries and authorities responsible for integration).
Outcome: The Ministry of Education and Culture has prepared a new report (2017:5) on the 
theme, which describes problematic areas in the action, including proposals for actions. 
ACTION 21: The security of all persons and employees involved with the integration pro-
cess will be guaranteed. (Responsibility: Ministries and authorities responsible for integra-
tion).
Outcome: The various actors take care of security issues as part of their basic duties. 
MEASURE 8:  
Prevent violent radicalisation and extremism through good, balanced and clear 
communications
Objective: Use words, in writing and in speech, in a manner that does not offend, 
label or radicalise any individuals or groups as supporters of violent extremism or, at 
the extreme, as terrorists. 
ACTION 22: Speech and words are important in preventing violent radicalisation and 
extremism. Poorly chosen words and expressions may exacerbate radicalisation and 
heighten the sense of marginalisation, which is often an important catalyst for violent rad-
icalisation. A glossary for ‘violent radicalisation and extremism’ will be prepared that will 
encompass the kinds of terms that are positive and constructive and whose use will not 
foment radicalisation. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of 
Violent Extremism).
Outcome: To be implemented during 2017.
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ACTION 23: Improve and clarify communications regarding the goals and means for pre-
venting violent radicalisation and extremism. Attempts will be made to engage in dia-
logue and interaction with different groups with the aim of achieving a sense of having 
shared goals and means. Prepare up-to-date material to support communications which 
increase awareness among those working to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism 
as regards messages between violent extremist groups, the means of dissemination and 
the focus groups of the messages. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network for the 
Prevention of Violent Extremism).
Outcome: In connection with the completion of a National Action Plan, key mes-
sages were prepared for the plan, posted on the website of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior and disseminated to the members of the Cooperation Network. Discussions on 
the matter have been held with different groups. The representative of the Minis-
try of the Interior has participated in the activities of the SSCAT project (ESCN as of 
autumn 2016), which is pursued under the EU, with the aim of developing, clarifying 
and improving communications related to violent radicalisation and measures to 
prevent propaganda. ESCN experts visited Helsinki in May 2017 and had discussions 
with experts of key importance to the theme. In autumn 2017, ESCN experts will 
arrange workshops on the theme for different actors. Experts have participated in 
communication seminars arranged by the RAN network that operates under the EU. 
ACTION 24: Further advance the situation overview arrangements on violent extremism. 
The goal is to disseminate up-to-date situational information on violent extremism in Fin-
land. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism).
Outcome: New guidelines were drafted in autumn 2016 for preparing situation 
overviews, and discussed in the National Cooperation Network. The Situation Over-
view published in 2016 discussed extremist crime in 2015. Preparing the Overview 
required a lot of work, so another overview was not compiled. An overview on 
trends in 2016 was published in February 2017. 
ACTION 25: Regularly organise round table discussions with members of the media, 
and, when necessary, other parties, on topical issues regarding violent radicalisation and 
extremism. (Responsibility: National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent 
Extremism, local cooperation groups).
Outcome: No round table discussions were arranged with the media in 2016. How-
ever, the intention is to continue the action, because it is considered an internation-
ally good practice. 
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ACTION 26: Experiences from different countries have shown that when crises associ-
ated with violent extremism occur, clear, balanced and successful communications are of 
paramount importance in limiting and reducing damage. A crisis communications plan 
will be prepared which will describe the principles of communications in situations which 
demand communicating information on the phenomena associated with violent radicali-
sation and extremism during disruptions, disturbances and crises. (Responsibility: National 
Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism).
Outcome: The implementation of the action will start in autumn 2017. 
MEASURE 9:  
Strengthen the ability of children and adolescents to identify, and guard against, 
violence-inducing messages and propaganda
Objective: Children and adolescents, on their own and together with others, are able 
to counter radical and extremist messages and propaganda. 
ACTION 27: Children and adolescents, on their own and together with others, are able 
to counter radical and extremist messages and propaganda. Media literacy is a key skill 
which bolsters the ability of children and adolescents to counter propaganda and the 
‘alternative media’ which has proliferated in recent years. In the general objectives of the 
core curricula for pre-primary and basic education, approved in 2014, and the objectives 
of the national core curriculum for upper secondary schools, approved in 2015, media lit-
eracy, as an element of across-the-board competency, is included in the multi-literacy skill 
set and in different subjects of basic education in a cross-cutting manner. Furthermore, 
the new objectives for basic education place increasing emphasis on human rights and 
adjustment to the democratic society. In addition to schools, also youth work, libraries and 
organisations, among others, promote media literacy. (Responsibility: Ministry of Educa-
tion and Culture, Finnish National Board of Education, National Audiovisual Institute KAVI). 
Outcome: The Ministry of the Interior and Finn Church Aid together arranged 
a socially oriented Safari camp for young people in June 2016. Implemented 
by DEMOS Helsinki, the camp focused on the theme of how young people can 
prevent violent radicalisation. As a result of the work, young people estab-
lished the YAVE (Youth Against Violent Extremism) network and decided to pre-
pare a website intended for young people. The young people who partici-
pated in the camp have also attended international activities, such as meet-
ings of the RAN Youth sub-working group, and acted as experts in projects car-
ried out by the authorities. The representatives of the YAVE network were invited 
to become members of the National Cooperation Network in summer 2017. 
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ACTION 28: Foreign policy, human rights and encounters with human rights violations as 
well as belittling human suffering are important underlying causes of violent radicalisa-
tion. Violent extremist movements effectively exploit these themes in their propaganda, 
fostering feelings of injustice and frustration. This is why many an adolescent feels that 
violent action is an important, or the only, means of direct influencing. We must make 
certain that young people have the opportunity to engage in open dialogue on topics 
that are important to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism by organis-
ing youth-centred debates and other events that focus on themes such as foreign policy, 
human rights, etc. (Responsibility: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Min-
istry of Justice).
Outcome: Finnish young people have set up the 2250 network that actively pro-
motes the implementation of Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security and 
consists of several youth and peace organisations. Its secretariat is the Finnish Youth 
Cooperation – Allianssi association. The 2250 network in Finland arranged a semi-
nar on 9 December 2016, the first anniversary of the resolution. The Ministry for For-
eign Affairs has met with members of the network and exchanged opinions. There 
are plans to arrange a round table discussion in 2017 together with Finn Church Aid 
and Finland’s 2250 network, focusing on the theme ‘youth, peace and security’.
ACTION 29: According to studies, Finnish adolescents, young boys especially, are 
extremely biased against ethnic minorities. Prejudice, and the associated fear of otherness, 
is often the result of ignorance. Cultural and global education will be intensified in schools 
and during leisure activities; opportunities for young people to visit different religious com-
munities (e.g. churches, mosques, synagogues, etc.) will be increased and opportunities for 
engaging in dialogue and interaction among different religions will be created. (Responsi-
bility: educational institutions, youth services, organisations, religious communities).
Outcome: Goals according to the measure are included in new curricula that were 
adopted in autumn 2016. 
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MEASURE 10:  
The particular responsibility of the police in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism
Objective: The police are comprehensively cognisant of their special responsibility in 
preventing and countering violent radicalisation and extremism. This responsibility 
stems from the fact that violent extremism, as a phenomenon, lies at the core of 
maintaining public order and security: guaranteeing a safe living environment and the 
safety of individuals and communities as well as protecting civil rights.
ACTION 30: The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism will be included 
as part of the pre-emptive action of the police and the Anchor model, which will be 
expanded. According to the decision of the National Police Board, all police departments 
must carry out activities as per the Anchor model. The model will include the prepar-
edness for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. All police departments will 
implement the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism at the minimum, basic 
or high level. (Responsibility: National Police Board).
Outcome: The Anchor model is pursued in almost all police department districts 
at least at the minimum level in order to prevent violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism (see Action 2). In the supplementary budget for 2017, additional resources were 
allocated to the police for developing multi-professional activities, i.e. personnel for 
the Anchor model. One man-year was allocated to each police department for the 
implementation of the activities. At the time of reporting (2 May 2017), personnel 
recruitments were still partly in progress. Helsinki Police Department has trained 
the personnel of all police departments in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism.
ACTION 31: Police presence on social media is a new and evolving feature. It is an ele-
ment of all police work, pre-emptive activities included. Thus far it has not systematically 
focused on violent radicalisation and extremism because its virtual presence has varied 
depending on the grounds of the police departments’ own capacities and focus areas on 
social media. The National Police Board will further develop the presence of the police on 
social media, at the same juncture, determine the content, goals and tasks of virtual police 
action on social media with regard to preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board). 
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Outcome: Every police unit has the obligation to arrange for supervised action of 
the police on social media as well as including supervised Internet presence. The 
action must be clearly supervised and its effectiveness developed from viewpoints 
that support the operation of the police, taking into consideration the joint impact 
of all police processes. The National Police Board has allocated resources to police 
departments for strengthening Internet police presence. The aim of each police 
department is to fill the position of at least one full-time Internet police officer. 
Internet police officers act as regional contact persons in a network of Internet 
police officers, support Helsinki Police Department’s new team that focuses on hate 
crime and hate speech, and participate in national Internet police tasks and in local 
multi-authority activities (the Anchor model). On 9 June 2017, the National Police 
Board issued instructions on the action of the police in social media, which direct 
the action of police departments and individual police officers in social media.
ACTION 32: The individuals that pose a security risk include those who have high poten-
tial for violence but are impervious to a criminal justice response, or who cannot be com-
mitted to involuntary treatment. In order to manage the security threat, a focused threat 
assessment instrument – a screening instrument – is being used at the command cen-
tres of Helsinki and Oulu Police Departments, and by nearly all police units. The screening 
instrument has proven viable in practice. It has already helped prevent potentially serious 
acts of violence and massacres. The police have developed a ‘National Threats’ utility. The 
goal of concentrating this function nationally is to further hone the threat evaluation pro-
cesses of the police, the screening instrument itself, to participate in international threat 
evaluation cooperation, to support police units in managing demanding and high-risk 
threats and to act as the national point of contact of the police vis-à-vis the other author-
ities, especially the social and healthcare authorities. The possibility of an expedited 
referral of risk individuals to specialised healthcare has not materialised as planned. There 
has been no success in establishing a uniform national model for case management. The 
‘national threats’ model will continue developing the introduction of the screening instru-
ment among the police authorities, the network of healthcare experts specialised in dan-
ger-level assessment and targeted violence, and a national model for referring an individ-
ual to a medical evaluation. (Responsibility: National Police Board)
Outcome: Measures to counter the threats of targeted violence have been devel-
oped under the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation. Police department visits 
were conducted at the beginning of 2017 in order to develop cooperation and activ-
ities. Work on developing the screening instrument was continued, together with 
participation in national and international cooperation in this sector. A thematic 
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network, which held an organising meeting in April 2017, has been established for 
reducing the threat of targeted violence. An internal seminar entitled ‘Actions to Pre-
vent Targeted Violence’ was arranged at the National Police Board in May 2017.
A pilot project is being launched in the Northern Ostrobothnia Hospital District for 
improving the entry of violent individuals to access medical assessment and care. 
The target group consists of individuals that pose a security risk and who have high 
potential for violence but are impervious to a criminal justice response, or who can-
not be committed to involuntary treatment. The aim is to create local procedures 
allowing violent individuals to access medical assessment and care as soon as pos-
sible. The prevailing opinion is that the number of individuals inclined towards seri-
ous violent behaviour has increased – also from the point of view of violent extrem-
ism. The question is of people whose violence potential has been assessed by an 
experienced professional (e.g. a special teacher or the police using their threat 
assessment tool) working with violent individuals.  The development work involves 
the Oulu Police Department, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the City of 
Oulu and the Northern Ostrobothnia Hospital District.
MEASURE 11:  
Actions aimed against different forms of violent radicalisation and extremism
Violent far right
Objective: Improve the preconditions of preventing recruitment to violent far right 
groups.
ACTION 33: So far the volume of violent far-right activities and the number of active 
members in Finland has been quite modest. However, recently there have been signs of 
increased activity among different groups. In order to prevent their membership from 
growing it is imperative to obtain information on the means of, and the individuals tar-
geted by, recruitment. The police will prepare a report to support pre-emptive action. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board, Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service).
Outcome: Work on preparing the report will start in autumn 2017, funded by the 
Ministry of the Interior/Police Department 
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Violent far left
Objective: Increase the competency and the preparedness of the police in countering 
left-wing extremist violence, which especially occurs during demonstrations.
ACTION 34: The threat of anarchist violence is particularly prevalent during demonstra-
tions. In these cases the violence also targets the authorities, particularly the police, as well 
as far-right groups and neo-Nazis whom the anarchists view as their main adversaries. The 
police will improve their action in countering violence during demonstrations. This includes 
action both before and after demonstrations. (Responsibility: National Police Board).
Outcome: Best practices related to the operation of the police during and after 
demonstrations have been disseminated to all police departments as part of the 
Project for Preventive Security implemented by the police. Some police departments 
have already visited the police departments in Helsinki to see how they deal with 
demonstrations. Work on developing capabilities will be continued in the national 
seminar on preventive security arranged by the police in May and November 2017.
Religiously motivated violent radicalisation and extremism 
Objective: Reduce the number of those travelling to conflict areas and establish 
processes for dealing with those returning from these areas.
ACTION 35: Per capita, and compared to similar situations in the past, quite many peo-
ple from Finland have travelled to conflict areas. Especially in recent times those having 
departed for Syria and Iraq have mainly joined the terrorist groups operating in the region. 
Extensive cooperation among the authorities, organisations and communities is required 
to reduce the number of people travelling to combat zones. However, it is important for 
one actor – the Anchor model – to be able to proceed in a situation when an individual is 
contemplating travelling to combat areas or is about to depart. The other actors can always 
contact the Anchor operators when they encounter an individual who is about to become 
radicalised. The Anchor model, and its cooperation with other actors, will be strengthened 
as regards preventing travel to conflict areas. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, Finn-
ish Security Intelligence Service, National Police Board)
Outcome: For more information on the Anchor model, see Action 30 and the 
REACH OUT project, Action 3. 
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ACTION 36: The individuals who have departed for the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq and 
are about to return pose a serious challenge to society. The first item of importance is to 
establish the identities of the people returning from the areas. Those having committed 
crimes must be brought to justice. Nonetheless, a number of them cannot be prosecuted 
for crimes: either there is not sufficient evidence or they do not pose any security threat. 
When it comes to these individuals, the most important thing is to reduce the risk of vio-
lence and the increasing risk of radicalisation associated with them, and to promote their 
re-integration into society. The procedures must be open, they must strengthen the secu-
rity of society and its inhabitants and reduce the risk of violence. The processes for manag-
ing those returning from combat zones will be established. (Responsibility: Ministry of the 
Interior, Ministry of Justice, National Police Board, Office of the Prosecutor General).
Outcome: The working group completed its proposal in March 2017, and the 
proposal was approved in the ministerial working group on internal security and 
administration of justice on 29 March 2017.  The Ministry of the Interior sent a 
request for action to those responsible for implementation. Follow-up information 
on the implementation will be collected in May 2018 and reported to the ministe-
rial working group on internal security and administration of justice thereafter.
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6 Local cooperation groups for preventing 
violent radicalisation
Local cooperation groups for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism were estab-
lished in 2012, based on the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisa-
tion and Extremism that was approved in 2012. In Oulu, Turku and Tampere, the network 
has been set up by the city authorities and its leader is an appointed city representative. In 
Helsinki, the network has been established by the Helsinki Police Department and it is led 
by the representative of the police. 
The operation of the local cooperation groups is briefly outlined below, based on the in-
formation submitted by the representatives of the cooperation groups in a joint meeting 
of the local networks on 28 April 2017. 
Local cooperation in Turku
The City of Turku has established a local cooperation group that is convened four times a 
year. All the key actors are represented in the group. Anchor model actors are also close-
ly engaged in the cooperation. Where necessary, outside experts, such as representatives 
from organisations, are invited to attend the meetings. The local situation overview is dis-
cussed in the meetings, and the members of the cooperation group share their experienc-
es, observations and assessments about the situation and the steps that should be taken 
to prevent any problems. The work of the cooperation group is based on an action plan 
whose implementation is revised on a regular basis. The cooperation group has arranged 
training for different actors, and this has been considered both necessary and successful. 
The operation of the network is felt to be useful and the network has promoted cooper-
ation between different actors and increased trust. The Southwest Finland Police Depart-
ment has established an internal cooperation group that coordinates and develops the 
actions of the police in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. 
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Local cooperation in Tampere
Tampere was one of the pilot cities in the scheme for preventing violent extremism that 
was confirmed in 2012. However, for different reasons, the action in Tampere began some-
what more slowly than in the other cities. The City of Tampere has established a coopera-
tion group whose operation has been quite active since 2016. The cooperation group has 
a broad array of representatives from different authorities and organisations. Its operation 
is based on an action plan that sets out from local problems. The intention is to involve dif-
ferent actors in the activities as well as possible, so meetings, for example, are arranged on 
the premises of different actors. Cooperation and activities are also pursued between the 
meetings. The executives of the City of Tampere are highly committed to preventing vio-
lent radicalisation and extremism, which is considered an extremely important resource. 
The action has an open-minded approach, and the various actors want to know the part-
ners and increase trust amongst themselves. The work emphasises a comprehensive ap-
proach in order to extend the situational picture across sectoral boundaries. 
Local cooperation in Oulu
The City of Oulu has established a large cooperation group in which organisations, too, 
are involved. The group has established its operation. The members of the cooperation 
group know each other, and the threshold to contact and discuss matters between the 
representatives of different organisations is low. Another value-adding contribution by the 
cooperation group is that it provides an easy point of contact towards different authorities 
and parties. The key tasks of the cooperation group include maintaining a local situation 
picture of violent radicalisation and extremism, dealing with detected instances pursu-
ant to confidentiality provisions, and arranging training. In its meetings, the cooperation 
group also monitors the progress of its projects. 
Local cooperation in Helsinki
The Helsinki Police Department established a local action cooperation network in 2013. 
The cooperation group consisted of actors representing several fields in the City of Hel-
sinki and third sector and government actors. The network focuses on the prevention of 
violent extremism and its task is to monitor phenomena related to violent extremism and 
their trends in Helsinki and prepare the necessary actions in order to tackle the detected 
phenomena. The cooperation group was also responsible for disseminating information 
and knowledge about violent extremism to other authorities and stakeholders. 
It turned out in the work of the cooperation group that the actors found it challenging 
to focus on the prevention of violent extremism only. They encountered highly varying 
concerns at the grass-roots level, which they needed to bring to the fore even though the 
concerns were not directly connected with violent extremism. For this reason, the opera-
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tion of the network was changed in autumn 2016 to focus on the safety of cities and more 
broadly on people’s well-being. It was considered purposeful to harness the broad exper-
tise available in the network to detect and counter any phenomena or issues that could 
endanger the safety of cities. 
The Helsinki Police Department established the ‘Safe Helsinki’ network at the beginning 
of 2017. The members of the network are the same as before, but a few new actors were 
added to it, including the representative of the City of Helsinki’s Urban Facts service and 
the Helsinki City Planning Department, and organisational actors. The key tasks of the new 
network include reducing confrontation and segregation and preventing the formation of 
gangs and violent extremism. Therefore, the prevention of violent extremism is regarded 
as a challenge among other challenges, not as the spearhead of the action. 
Based on the first meeting of the new network, the reform was considered important, be-
cause it allows the various actors to discuss concerns more broadly and to form a situation 
picture. The problems facing a rapidly changing society are complex and sometimes diffi-
cult to distinguish from each other. Among others, the members of the network hoped for 
critical reflection on concepts and phenomena, their causes and mechanisms so that the 
phenomena could be correctly understood, and for the dissemination of information on 
observations, concerns and tacit signals.
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7 Links
National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (decision 
29 March 2016): 
https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/74921/Toimenpideoh-
jelma_final.pdf?sequence=1
Arranging cooperation between the authorities on how to deal with individuals returning 
from the combat zones in Syria and Iraq (decision 29 March 2017):
http://vnk.fi/documents/10616/1266558/Taistelualueilta+palaavat+raport-
ti+29032017/435a1edf-25e8-4232-b23a-aea35e0242ad
The Radicalisation Awareness Network RAN has prepared a handbook on how to deal with 
individuals returning from combat zones that also takes their families into consideration. 
Special attention in the handbook is paid to the situation with the children of such individ-
uals and with children born in combat zones. It contains instructions for the strategic level 
and for actors engaged in concrete measures, such as teachers, social workers and the po-
lice. It also presents best practices. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf
‘Constructive interaction - Guide to strengthening democratic involvement and prevent-
ing hate speech and violent radicalism’ (in Finnish), Finnish National Agency for Education 
2017:
http://www.oph.fi/download/182479_rakentavaa_vuorovaikutusta.pdf
Ministry of the Interior PO Box 26, FI-00023 Government, Finland 
www.intermin.fi
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